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MINUTES OF THE IAC MEETING - 16 DECEMBER 1949

DIRECTOR: The first proposal this afternoon is Crisis Situations. In the substance of this proposal everyone is in agreement. I feel, personally, that it is not necessary that it go to the NSC. We can justify it under the implementing agreement under NSCID 1. That is my opinion and I am going to send a letter with it when I forward it, to protect myself from a little sarcasm there from some of the boys, saying that I feel that it is not necessary that it be an NSCID, and can be issued as a DCI. Sometimes some of the big shots get a little sarcastic and I want to be covered both ways. You all got copies of the Army proposal. One thing we would like to add in that, on the second last line: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly disseminate the national intelligence estimate in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 above" there should be added: "produce and disseminate the national intelligence estimate in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 above."

ADM ESPE: Is that a proposed rewording of the paper approved by the Standing Committee?

DIRECTOR: Yes.

GEN. IRWIN: Incidentally, in that estimate, I am asking for information now because I am not too sure of the provisions, if such a situation should arise and we produce such an estimate would it go out over your signature, or would you produce it and say there are dissenting views?

DIRECTOR: That is provided for in paragraph 5 of NSCID 1. I think that is always understood.

GEN. IRWIN: I want to make sure. I'll add that in.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I would prefer the word "prepare" to "produce."
It is just a matter of semantics.

DIRECTOR: That is all right with me. I don't see any difference in that. "Prepare" is all right.

GEN. IRWIN: Substitute "prepare" for "produce"?

MR. ARMSTRONG: I offer that.

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DIRECTOR: The only reason we said produce is because in paragraph 4 it speaks of producing. Any comments on that?

(NO COMMENTS)

DIRECTOR: What is the decision about how this goes in? As an amendment to NSCID 1 or as a DCI?

GEN. IRWIN: I want the amendment to NSCID 1. I feel that it is a pretty important responsibility. There has been a lot of criticism over in my place in the past. Under the existing thing, you can't take the responsibility on it. If you produce it, you will be the individual who will be the fall guy. This would make us all fall guys. Your name is signed, but the IAC is stuck with the proposition, which is right. You can certainly cite us, or if we fail to concur we put our seal on it and take the rap. I think we should; and the fact that this is issued by the NSC gives it national authority, an estimate that the individual services, within their dissent, would have to accept, which is rather a necessary thing. We have had occasions in the services where we had to take unilateral action on our estimates, whether there were other estimates or not. A need existed, and there was pretty lively confusion in the field as a result. I think this ties it down as an NSC estimate. I imagine they would accept it.

DIRECTOR: I don't agree with your opinion. I think you have perfect authority and real responsibility, because NSC 50 speaks about what the responsibilities would be. I am perfectly willing to send in the amendment to the NSCID. I don't think it is necessary, but if the IAC wants it -

GEN. IRWIN: I want it spelled out. You can imply it here, we are spelling it out.

DIRECTOR: I have heard Dean Acheson get very sarcastic. We can do it either way to avoid anyone saying "my dear friend, you already have that authority, why are you bringing it here?" We think we can do it and let them choose.

GEN. IRWIN: If they reject the NSCID, I can't stop them. That is what I would prefer.

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DIRECTOR: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] I agree with the General.

ADM. ESPE: I don't feel too strongly, but I think it should be an NSCID.

COL. ALLEN: We are in sympathy with the General's approach. And we also feel that in a crisis situation you have an extra-normal situation, which falls beyond, what I believe you consider, your duties under the NSCID 1. This is a special crisis situation which we feel comes under the interests and responsibilities of the National Security Council and that they should prescribe the policy.

DIRECTOR: They have already prescribed it.

DR. COLBY: It is all right with me either way.

ADM. WOMBLE: I would like to have it spelled out.

MR. ARMSTRONG: We have no preference. We will go along with the majority on this.

DIRECTOR: That is the way it will be. An amendment with a covering letter that we think we can do it, and let them pick.

We have one more item. I don't know whether you all got this Defector paper or not, but you probably didn't.

ADM. WOMBLE: I have my vote sheet here.

GEN. IRWIN: We are for it. We have already sent ours in.

DIRECTOR: ^I am sorry we didn't get the thing mimeographed up until late yesterday afternoon.

MR. CHILDS: Do they all go along with the November 29 one? That is what the enclosure with it is.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I had understood that the Air Force was going to propose a language change.

COL. ALLEN: In paragraph 8. I have coordinated it all around by telephone. In paragraph 8 the second line should read: "The Department of State and that military department having executive authority in the area."

MR. ARMSTRONG: Which is entirely agreeable.

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GEN. IRWIN: It is agreeable with us.

MR. CHILDS: "That military department having executive authority in the area."

DIRECTOR: Is that amendment acceptable?

MR. CHILDS: We will say "approved as amended?"

ADM. WOMBLE: Yes.

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[REDACTED] We haven't gotten our copy, but if it is the same as the November 29, we will go along with that. We will send the voting slip in on that.

DIRECTOR: Approved with comments? You don't even have to send it back. That is all the official business for the meeting this afternoon.

GEN. IRWIN: I have an item and I am slightly stumped. I had a very astonishing thing happen to me. General McNarney, head of the Management, and hatchet man for the Secretary of Defense, who is very definitely a taker away and not a giver, called me on the matter of the agency for devices for counter-intelligence agents, an activity for the Wright Field Laboratory, and asked if I was interested. I said I was and also the other service agencies, and he asked what we were doing about it. I said we had big ideas, but we had no money and no space. He said he would give us money and space if we would give him a good proposition. That is the first offer to come from him. So now I have an opportunity to do something about that. I don't think that is of interest to all of us here, but I thought the three services were and CIA is very much interested in what it is doing in that field. And it is still the question of what to present to General McNarney, or should we get you, Hilly, to take them?

DIRECTOR: With the conditions being imposed, we are not going to take it. The principle one is this guy, the boss of it, he came over here and gave us a long song and dance, and confirmed a lot we believed before. He gave us an ultimatum that he came with everything or we don't get a thing. We are willing not to take a thing. It is now a service matter.

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COL. ALLEN: Are you talking about [REDACTED] My understanding is that he is unemployed.

DIRECTOR: You're damn right he is, if he is coming with us.

GEN. IRWIN: Actually he is out, the Air Corp let him go.

DIRECTOR: He came over here and talked for 45 minutes about what he was going to do - and that was all or nothing. We would take all or nothing, and a few things like that, so I say he is definitely out of employment.

GEN. IRWIN: We don't have to have him, but I got an offer of money and space.

DIRECTOR: You had better take it, that comes so rarely.

COL. ALLEN: The question arises as to whether or not this agency could be operated by CIA. There is a provision in NSCID 1 which provides that CIA operate for the members of the IAC, as directed by the NSC. We feel that this would be a very logical activity to put in CIA if all of the services could derive some benefits from its product. It could, on the other hand, go almost anywhere else. It could be established as one of the charter agencies, provided its charter was arranged so the services interested in its product would have access to it and could state their requirements for the devises and gadgets and have access to it after it has been developed. As far as [REDACTED] is concerned, General Cabell feels that he would be able to contribute something to this. Maybe not as the director of it or chief of the activity, but as one of the participants, because he has developed a field of experience, and as General Cabell puts it, he is possessed of a diabolical mind and his inventions are diabolical.

STATOTHR

DIRECTOR: Most of the stuff in the laboratory is done for the Air Technical Liaison Office.

COL. ALLEN: And for the special OSI (Office of Special Investigations). I believe General Carroll, or his representative, was going to be here. He has an interest in some of the products for special operations.

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GEN. IRWIN: To represent SI? He became involved in the thing, and indicating the character of the devices, I was surprised at the effort they were making. They get the requirements, but on these little things they put out gets a very low priority. Our technical services would be interested too if we had funds and a central agency some place where it would be boxed. It will not only interest our shop, but the whole War Department. It is a small activity and needs a guiding hand some place.

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ADM. ESPE: Isn't there anyone ^{who has the} know-how beside [REDACTED]

I think it is very desirable and necessary. I know in the Navy our research in that field is carried on by our Office of Naval Research, and they are putting out money to a certain company to do some work on it, so there must be other qualified people beside [REDACTED]

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ADM. WOMBLE: The only disturbing element is on the part of CIA.

DIRECTOR: No, because that has no connection with us. We have no connection with it.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Is it a service that should be defined as one of common concern and therefore comes within your coordinating service?

DIRECTOR: There is 20% or 25% of common concern and the other 75% is of no interest to us, or any interest to you.

MR. ARMSTRONG: But it is apparently to the military and if it is of common concern to one of them and CIA, I think it might come within the definition of common concern.

DIRECTOR: We have practically the part that does concern us. We have it all set up and we don't need any other.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I am wholly ignorant of what this shop does. I wonder if that principle would apply?

COL. ALLEN: Our laboratory has now been dissolved. It doesn't exist any more. The equipment has been split up, some retained. I think one airplane load of it has already been brought to Washington for your shop and I believe our office of Special Investigations has

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accepted some of it and it has been a multiway split, but formerly this shop engaged in the manufacture of gadgets that would be useful in collecting evidence or intelligence. It served our office of Special^{25X1C} Investigations very well. They furnished [REDACTED]^{25X1C} cameras and like that to our attaches in the field to use in collecting information. That was a more formal supply or service activity which this particular shop developed in the course of its operations. It has been separated and is now part of our normal supply system, but we would like to see an agency established that would interest itself in the research and development of special gadgets for use in both the overt and covert fields. I would say taking on requirements, stated by the services, conducting the research, and producing and delivering a prototype article and procurement special to the services, who would then procure it through their formal agency. In the interest of security, we feel that CIA would almost have to conduct the agency.

DIRECTOR: We will do all we can. We are not fighting it, we don't want to take over the laboratory or the personnel.

COL. ALLEN: The laboratory doesn't exist.

DIRECTOR: And I think there are some contracts out.

COL. ALLEN: They would have to be assumed. There is some personnel available that we did not re-employ.

ADM. ESPE: These contracts are all classified, I understand.

DIRECTOR: As far as I know they are.

ADM. ESPE: I know ours are. This equipment is very closely held
Top Secret.

GEN. IRWIN: They had some very formidable gadgets. They had a little recorder that you could carry in your pocket and talk two hours and it would record everything that was said.

DIRECTOR: How much money will General McNarney give you?

GEN. IRWIN: We can blow this up. We want a justification and I wonder whether to put the paper in to run it up to the JCS. It could be an NSC, a joint staff. I don't know where to put it. The Research

and Development Board has done a lot for us, but this agency can call on the Research and Development Board for many things. A created agency would have the authority to deal with people.

ADM. ESPE: This agency, as I understand it, designs and produces for the services and whoever needed it would have to supply the money?

GEN. IRWIN: If it is given a field it could go on the table as a standard item, but, of course, if they were a common item I guess we had better run it through our military department.

DIRECTOR: I should think so.

GEN. IRWIN: We will sell you the product.

DIRECTOR: Hell, we are competing with you. We are competitors. You want to watch out for the road blocks. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Nothing.

COL. ALLEN: No, sir.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Nothing, other than to inquire where we stand on the other defector paper.

MR. CHILDS: That has gone out to the Standing Committee, I believe, a day or two ago.

MR. ARMSTRONG: Still before the Standing Committee?

MR. CHILDS: It is the second run around. It is probably over in your shops now.

MR. ARMSTRONG: I would like to express for the State Department that we get that through as soon as possible and not let too much of a gap between the overseas one and the domestic one. Had it been your plan to send these up to the NSC separately, or wait until the domestic one is ready?

DIRECTOR: Separately. We have the overseas one on our neck now. that is the reason we tried to get the voting slips, so we could get it in at the next meeting, which is next Thursday. If there is nothing more that is all.

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